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Abstract
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It is typically assumed that being hard-working or clever 
is a trait of the person, in the sense that it is always 
there, in a fixed manner. However, in an experiment 
with almost 600 boys in India, cues to one’s place in 
the traditional caste order turn out to influence the 
expression of these traits. The experiment assigned 
students to different treatments with respect to the 
salience of caste and had them solve mazes under 
incentives. It turned out that making caste salient can 
reduce output by about 25 percent, which is equivalent 
to twice the effect on output of being one year younger. 
The channels through which this occurs differ by caste 
status. For the upper castes, the decline in performance 
under piece rates can only be explained by a shift in 
preferences regarding the provision of effort. When the 
ascriptive caste order is cued, upper-caste individuals 
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may think, “I don’t need to excel.” In contrast, for the 
lower castes, which were traditionally “untouchables,” 
publicly revealing caste identity impairs the ability to 
learn and may lead individuals to think, “I can’t (or don’t 
dare to) excel.” This paper provides a measure of the 
impact that ascriptive, hierarchized identities can have on 
preferences and performance after a society—in its public 
pronouncements and legislation—has adopted norms of 
equality in a formal sense. 
   The findings are important because they suggest that 
when contexts cue identities founded on the superseded 
rules of a hierarchical institution, the effects on human 
capital formation and development can be first-order. 
Contexts that make traditional identities salient are an 
underemphasized source of impediments to institutional 
change. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
A number of models in economics give different answers to the question of how someone’s  
identity—an individual’s sense of the social categories to which he belongs—might affect his 
preferences and behavior.  We present an experiment that allows us to discriminate among some 
of these models.  We report evidence that situational cues to identity can alter preferences to 
work hard, the ability to learn new skills, and the response to competitive environments.  In 
particular, we provide a measure of the impact that ascriptive, hierarchized identities can have on 
preferences and performance after a society—in its public pronouncements and legislation—has 
adopted norms of equality in a formal sense.   
Our findings are important because they suggest that when contexts cue identities 
founded on the superseded rules of a hierarchical institution, the effects on human capital 
formation and development can be first-order.  Contexts that make traditional identities salient 
are an underemphasized source of impediments to institutional change.   
A central goal in many disciplines is to understand how identity affects behavior.  
Historians have documented that societies all over the world have systematically invented 
identities and used symbols, etiquette, rituals, dress codes, and segregation to impress on people 
the notion that individuals in different groups represented significantly different categories and 
were subject to different constraints.  For example, in Growing up Jim Crow: How Black and 
White Southern Children Learned Race, Jennifer Ritterhouse (2006, p. 4) describes how the 
unwritten rules that governed interactions across race lines were used “not only as a form of 
social control but also as a script for the performative creation of…‘race’ itself.”   In Power in 
the Blood, David Warren Sabean (1984, p. 59) shows how elites in early modern Germany used 
the Catholic sacrament to impress on peasants a caste-like hierarchy:     
“The ordeal [of the sacrament] demanded more than just external compliance [as it 
entailed] massive inroads into their consciousness….It was through the sacrament that 
various state officials attempted to mediate their conceptions of the person, guilt, 
conscience, and justice.…”  
 
Anthropologists emphasize that the assumption in standard economic models of 
autonomous individuality belies the fact that “we inevitably think with concepts that have been 
developed by others” (Collier, 1997, p. 5).  Our title alludes to and amplifies the title of an essay, 
“Making Up People,” in which the philosopher Ian Hacking (1986) argues that the creation of 
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new slots in which to fit and categorize people, e.g. the perverted, the suicidal, and the 
heterosexual or homosexual person, molds individuals’ sense of themselves and hence their 
behavior.   
Of interest to us is here is how identity affects preferences over effort, the ability to learn, 
and the response to competitive environments.  A standard view, which derives from Max 
Weber, is that culture—as a matter of self-conscious orientation or identity—imparts values that 
are consistent across situations.  The values explain action.  However, there is an alternative 
view, drawing on cognitive psychology, that culture is fragmented and contradictory:  a given 
culture provides multiple frames, understandings, and worldviews, and they may not be 
consistent with one another.  According to the sociologists Ann Swidler (1986, 2001) and Paul 
DiMaggio (1997), culture shapes behavior through frames that are situationally evoked and that 
determine which actions seem possible and desirable in that situation, given a person’s values.  
Background settings or contexts can alter motives and behavior by evoking a particular aspect of 
the self or a particular worldview and by altering the framework of meanings that help to 
constitute one’s social identity.   
To test this hypothesis, we draw on our experiment in rural India that manipulates the 
salience and publicness of caste identity.1  Under the traditional caste system, preeminence was 
assigned to birth rather than competition (Béteille, 2011, II[2003], p. 11):  
“For centuries it was believed that a man’s social capacities were known from the caste 
or the lineage into which he was born, and that no further test was necessary to determine 
what these capacities were.” (p. 99, emphasis added) 
 
A body of work in anthropology supports the view that individual mobility2 was nearly 
impossible in the traditional caste system for someone who remained in or near his village, 
                                                          
1 Hoff and Pandey (2006) summarize the treatments that use only piece rate incentives (N =336) but do not 
present the treatments that use both piece rate and tournament incentives (N=246).  
2 As distinct from collective mobility up or down the caste hierarchy.  The caste system is the product of 
politics and, thus, local political forces bring about changes in the local caste hierarchy and also in the 
number of distinct castes over the medium-  to long-term (Rao and Ban 2007).  In addition, when caste 
identity takes on significance for government incentives, some individuals are able to manipulate their 
official caste designation, but even this process is slow.  Thus Cassan (2011) estimates that over the 
course of 20 years, in response to British classification of some castes as “agricultural castes” whose 
members could own land, and others as “non-agricultural castes” whose members could not, 7.5% of the 
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where his caste identity would be known (e.g. Gupta 2000, Srinivas 2009).  A low-caste boy 
could not move up, a high-caste boy could not move down.   
At the bottom of the traditional caste hierarchy are the castes whose members were 
traditionally marked as “unclean.”  They were called untouchables and are today called Dalits.  
Untouchability has several dimensions:  exclusion from public spaces and water sources, 
humiliation (including prohibition from all but menial occupations), and exploitation by the high 
castes (Desphande, 2011, p. 9).  Untouchability is illegal under the Constitution of India, and 
attitudes towards Dalits are radically different today from what they were in the recent past 
(Kapur et al. 2010).  But the social division persists.  Bros and Couttenier (2011) use official 
Indian crime statistics for 2001 to demonstrate the systematic use of violence across India to 
enforce untouchability rules.  Two surveys give some indication of how untouchability plays out 
in schools:   
“One common example of social prejudice in the classroom is the disparaging attitude of 
upper caste teachers towards Dalit children. This can take various forms, such as telling 
Dalit children that they are ‘stupid,’ making them feel inferior, using them for menial 
chores, and giving them liberal physical punishment.” (PROBE, 1999, p. 51) 
 
“In one out of four primary schools in rural India, Dalit children are forced by their 
teachers or by convention to sit apart from non-Dalits.  As many as 40 percent of schools 
practice untouchability while serving mid-day meals, making Dalit children sit in a 
separate row while eating.”  (Shah et al., 2006, p.168, based on a 2001-02 national 
survey) 
 
Participants in our experiment were 288 junior high school boys drawn from the top of 
the caste hierarchy (the “General Castes”, hereafter “high castes”), and 294 junior high school 
boys drawn from the bottom of the caste hierarchy (the Dalits, hereafter “low castes”).   In 
groups of six, participants solved mazes under incentives under one of three conditions that 
varied the publicness and salience of caste.   
In the first condition, caste identity, which is not discernible from natural physical 
markers,3 was not made public in a session of three high-caste and three low-caste boys.  Since 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
population that had an incentive to change their identity from a non-agricultural to an agricultural caste 
member were able to do so. 
3 See Deliège (1999) and Gupta (2000).  In contrast, Hindu surnames do constitute a marker of caste.  For 
that reason some low-caste groups have sought a constitutional amendment to abolish Hindu surnames 
(The Telegraph, October 15, 2005, “Slash Surname to Kill Caste”).     
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there is a large overlap in poverty between high-and low-caste households in the local 
population, quality of dress is not an automatic sign of caste status.  Thus we call the first 
condition “Caste Not Revealed.” 
In the second condition (“Revealed Mixed”), caste identity was made public.  As in the 
first condition, a session was composed of three high-caste boys and three low-caste boys.  
The third condition (“Revealed Segregated”) was the same as the second except that a 
session was composed of only high-caste boys or only low-caste boys.  Participants would likely 
have been aware that the composition of their session reflected deliberate segregation by caste 
status.  This is so because participants were brought to the experiment site in groups with an 
equal number of high-caste and low-caste boys.  Then each boy waited while other participants 
arrived until he was called in to be part of a newly formed group of six to participate in the 
experiment.  Given the caste shares in the population of schoolchildren, the probability that a 
group of only high-caste or only low-caste students could result from a random draw of the local 
school population is very small (less than (0.2)6 = 0.00006).  As discussed above, enforced 
segregation of the low caste is a sign of high-caste dominance. 
We have three main findings, and they are robust to our controls for individual 
characteristics.    
Result 1. Under piece rate incentives Revealed Segregated reduces high-caste 
performance.  High-caste participants solve 26% fewer mazes in Revealed Segregated than they 
do when caste is not revealed, controlling for individual characteristics.  Under the piece rate 
incentive, the output and payoff of a participant are completely independent of the output of the 
other participants.  A participant’s output thus depends only on his ability and his preferences 
over the provision of effort.  There is no plausible reason why the ability of a high-caste 
participant would be impaired in the Revealed Segregated condition.  On the contrary, a large 
body of literature in psychology, discussed in the next section, finds that if cued for an aspect of 
one’s identity that is stereotyped as gifted, or if asked to recall memories of being powerful, an 
individual becomes better able to perform cognitive tasks.  To our knowledge there is only one 
study, by Shih et al. (2008), that finds an ambiguous effect on performance of activating a 
positive stereotype about a group’s intelligence, an effect that the authors explain as the result of 
anxiety from the fear of failure to meet high expectations.  But we are able to show that the 
activation of high-caste identity in Revealed Segregated does not lower self-confidence and does 
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not cause anxiety that interferes with the ability to learn.  Given this, we conclude that the 
decline in high-caste performance in Revealed Segregated reflects a change in preferences 
regarding the provision of effort.   
Our preferred interpretation is that the Revealed Segregated condition evokes a mental 
frame in which high-caste participants feel less need to achieve.  Recalling the quotation from 
Béteille, in the traditional caste system high-caste individuals’ preeminence was assigned by 
birth and “no further test was necessary to determine what these capacities were.”  A 
considerable literature in psychology and economics, discussed below, suggests that preferences 
are context-dependent. They are influenced by arbitrary “anchors,” the presentation (“framing”) 
of the choice problem, and cues to identity.   
Result 2. Under piece rate incentives Revealed Segregated reduces low-caste 
performance, and Revealed Mixed creates a caste gap in favor of the high caste.  When caste is 
not revealed, low-caste boys solve mazes just as well as high-caste boys, whereas making caste 
public reduces mean low-caste relative to high-caste performance in Revealed Mixed.  The caste 
gap is 20% controlling for individual characteristics.  We infer that in other possible worlds the 
low castes could have been an equal or dominant group; there are no intrinsic differences in 
ability between high and low castes; a social identity has affected behavior.  This result extends 
to a new social group, low-caste individuals of India, a large body of work in psychology that 
demonstrates that cues to a person’s identity if it is stereotyped as intellectually inferior 
undermine the person’s ability to perform cognitive tasks (“stereotype threat”). 
Result 3. Making caste identity public eliminates the positive output response to 
competitive environments by both the high and low castes.  When caste identity is not public, 
high-caste participants solve 25% more mazes under winner-take-all tournament incentives than 
under piece rates.  The comparable figure for the low caste is 28%.  In contrast, when caste is 
made public, performance does not improve under tournament incentives.  Indeed, in the 
segregated sessions, the low-caste participants solve 38% fewer mazes under tournament 
incentives than under piece rate incentives, controlling for individual characteristics.  Our 
interpretation of this perverse response has two elements.  First, the Revealed Segregated 
condition cues a worldview in which preeminence is assigned to birth, not competition, and in 
which for a low-caste person to perform well in a non-menial task may not be liked.  This 
worldview is very likely encountered in early childhood experiences of growing up low caste, in 
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fables that children learn, and in the continued atrocities against upwardly mobile low-caste 
individuals.4  A second explanation relies on strategic responses.  It could be that the low-caste 
boys have internalized beliefs about their ability that are encapsulated in the caste system, with 
the result that they try less hard in a tournament facing only low-caste boys, who they believe are 
less able, than in a tournament facing both high- and low-caste competitors.   
To help organize the discussion of our experimental results, in the next section we outline 
five theories about how a sense of identity with others might affect preferences and behavior.  
Sections 3-5 present the experiment and results.  Section 6 presents additional support for our 
identity-based arguments.  In the concluding section, we argue that our findings suggest the need 
for a view of development that takes into account the multiple ways of “making up people.” 
 
2.   Five Theories about Identity and Preferences/Behavior 
 
Theory 1:  Identity has no effect on preferences.  In the textbook model in economics, 
an individual has fixed preferences in which a sense of identity with others has no influence.  
This theory is one of the fundamental differences between the standard model of economics and 
the conception of the individual that has increasingly been found useful in other social sciences, 
in which socially defined variables, such as conformity, affect preferences. 
Theory 2:  Identity is an element of fixed preferences.  The theory that an individual has, 
at any moment in time, a well-defined set of preferences and that they are always salient is 
maintained in recent work that substantially broadens the notion of preferences by incorporating 
one’s sense of group membership.  In Akerlof and Kranton (2000), a social category constitutes 
part of an individual’s identity.  Associated with the category are a set of norms or ideals for how 
someone in that category should behave.  The individual likes conforming to the ideals of that 
category, and dislikes actions by others that deviate from the ideals.  A related idea in Ray 
(2006) is that a person’s membership in a particular group shapes his aspirations.  
Theory 3:  Identity is an element of fixed preferences, but it is chosen.  An individual 
chooses his social identities, i.e. he can define himself and his relationships to others at a 
                                                          
4 E.g. Jadhav 2005.  A recent Indian television show provided one of the first public settings where 
viewers could watch low-caste individuals talk first-hand about their harsh and horrifying experiences of 
growing up as untouchables (www.satyamevjayate.in, episode 10). 
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categorical level (Akerlof and Kranton 2002, Fang and Loury 2005, Hoff and Sen 2006, and 
Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006, Sen 2006).  For example, a descendant of Irish immigrants to the 
US can define himself as Irish-American or not.  The individual’s choice problem makes sense 
only under the assumption that an individual has a meta-utility function.  However, just as in the 
two models above, an individual has well-defined preferences that provide all the information 
that is relevant for describing his choices.  
Theory 4:  In contexts in which it is salient, identity is a framing device that orients 
action.  An individual has an extended utility function that expresses itself automatically in one 
way or another if stimulated appropriately (Salant and Rubinstein 2008).  The work of decades of 
experiments supports a theory that “allows individual choice to depend on the context in which 
the choices are made” (Grether and Plott, 1979).  Preferences can be shaped by cues that are 
irrelevant to the rational assessment of alternatives but that trigger memories, cue norms, or 
make a particular aspect of the self accessible.  In the studies of Benjamin et al. (2010) and 
LeBeouf et al. (2010), individuals were asked to fill out a background questionnaire that focused 
on an identity.  A questionnaire that primed Asian identity made Asian-Americans more 
cooperative and patient and less individualistic, and a questionnaire that primed a “family-
oriented” identity triggered values related to family obligations.  These results support the 
hypothesis that people have multiple identities and the current context determines which is 
uppermost.  We can make an analogy to DNA.  DNA are the instructions for making an 
individual, but as yet poorly understood features of the environment determine the “on-and-off 
states of genes” (www.nature.com/encode). 
Where the idea of an extended utility function becomes interesting is that it leads to the 
observation of inconsistent choices.  Of course, if we knew all the stimuli to the individual, then 
the theory of rationality (i.e. consistency) would be trivial.  Since we do not observe all stimuli, 
and our understanding of the ways that individuals process information is limited, it becomes a 
useful construct to posit multiple preferences, one for each self-construal or worldview.   
Useful for what purpose?   It may be useful for understanding long-run social change, 
which entails changes in the set of possible identities, the salience of particular identities, and the 
possible ways of understanding a situation.  In the process of economic development, the stimuli 
to an individual can change in a way that leads to the expression of one set of preferences rather 
than another.  That is, preferences depend on context.   
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Theory 5: “Stereotype susceptibility.”  Finally, another body of evidence in psychology 
relates to the nature of human productivity, rather than preferences.  It finds that individuals’ 
productivity in a given situation depends on their sense of themselves in that situation.  In dozens 
of experiments over many domains (e.g., SATs, chess, and sports),  priming a negatively or 
positively stereotyped aspect of an individual’s identity shifts performance in the direction of the 
stereotype:  African-Americans do worse on scholastic aptitude tests if before the test they are 
asked to check a box for their race (Steele and Aronson 1995); student athletes at a selective 
college do worse on academic tests if their identity as an athlete is made salient (Dee, in press); 
Asian-American women, if the Asian aspect of identity is made salient, do better on math tests 
than women in the no-prime condition, but if their gender is made salient, do worse than women 
in the no-prime condition (Shih, Pittinsky, and Ambady 1999).  Children in both lower 
elementary grades and middle school grades (but not those in upper elementary grades) showed 
shifts in performance consistent with the patterns of “stereotype threat” and “stereotype boost” 
(Ambady et al. 2001 and Afridi, Li, and Ren 2010). 
 However, the subtlety of stereotype activation also plays a role in boosting performance. 
This is an issue we will have to address in interpreting our findings since we used a strong prime 
to caste identity.  In two experiments, Shih et al. (2002) randomly assigned Asian-American 
students to one of three treatments:  a blatant prime to Asian identity, a subtle prime to Asian 
identity, or no prime.  Following this treatment, participants took a math test.  Whereas in both 
experiments, the subtle prime significantly increased Asian-Americans’ average score on the 
test, in one of the two experiments the blatant prime significantly decreased it—perhaps by 
creating for participants anxiety that they would not live up to the high expectations for Asians in 
the U.S.   
Mediating factors in stereotype threat include the ability to concentrate and physiological 
reactions, of which “choking” under pressure is an extreme example (Schmader, Johns, and 
Forbes 2008).  A phenomenon underlying the effects of activating stereotypes, which seems 
particularly relevant in the context of caste in India, is the effect on the person’s feelings of 
power and control.  In experiments that randomly divided individuals into two groups and asked 
the first group to recall memories of being powerful, and the second group to recall memories of 
being powerless, the former group surpassed the latter in cognitive performance and goal- 
directed behavior, whereas the latter group surpassed the former in distractibility and attention to 
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peripheral information (Galinsky, Gruenfeld and Magee, 2003; Guinote, 2006; and Smith et al. 
2008).  Neuroscience is finding a neural basis for these responses.  In a recent study, women 
taking a math test in conditions of stereotype threat did not recruit the neural regions associated 
with mathematical learning, but instead showed heightened activation in a neural region 
associated with social and emotional processing (Krendl et al. 2008).  More broadly, 
neuroscientists are finding that early environmental exposure to stress can affect the chemistry of 
the DNA, with a long-term effect on one’s responses to stress (Begley 2007 and Pollak 2008).  
Children who had earlier been exposed to stressful events react more strongly to current sources 
of stress.  We conjecture that for a low-caste child who has encountered stressful events related 
to his caste identity, increasing the salience of caste is a source of stress, and that his reaction to 
it would be strong.  In contrast, a high-caste child, because of his early experiences, may find 
comfort and power in contexts in which his caste identity is salient.  
We conclude this section by noting that theories 4 and 5, unlike the first three theories, 
assume that individuals are constrained in their ability to process information (see Kahneman 
2003).  If working memory were infinitely expandable, then cues to identity could have no 
impact, since the thinker would already have the associations with all aspects of his identity in 
working memory.  But if working memory is limited, cues can make certain memories and 
certain meanings that partly constitute one’s identity more accessible.  In essence, theories 4 and 
5 state that current cues to identity affect what is in the thinker’s working memory and thereby 
influence, respectively, his current preferences and his current ability to perform.   
3.  Participants and Design 
 
288 high-caste (hereafter H) and 294 low-caste junior high-school boys (hereafter L) in the 
district of Hardoi in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh participated in the study.  In the 19th 
century, this region was characterized by feudal rule.  Its legacy today is greater high-caste 
dominance compared to areas of the state that did not have such rule (Pandey 2010).   
Participants in groups of six solved mazes.  These six boys were generally drawn from 
different villages, but since this was not always the case, we will control for the number of other 
participants that a participant knew.  Each participant, just before entering the car that brought 
him to the experiment site, was asked in private his name, village name, father’s name, 
grandfather’s name, and caste.  On arriving at the site, we verified in private with each 
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participant his name and caste before randomly assigning him to a treatment and sending him to 
a large classroom, where participants were entertained for up to an hour while waiting for all the 
cars bringing participants from other villages to arrive.  The focus of the experiment was on the 
effect of three conditions that varied the publicness and salience of caste identity in the session, 
which was always led by a high-caste young woman experimenter: 
Caste Not Revealed (the control condition).  A session was composed of 3 H and 3 L. No 
personal information about the participants was revealed.  
 
Revealed Mixed (i.e. caste revealed in a mixed-caste session).  The composition of a 
session was the same as in the preceding condition, but now the experimenter began a 
session by saying that she would like to confirm some information with each participant, 
who should nod if it is correct. Then the experimenter turned to each participant and 
stated his name, village name, father’s name, grandfather’s name, and caste. 
 
Revealed Segregated  (i.e. caste revealed in a segregated session). This was the same as 
the preceding condition except that a session was composed of either 6 H or 6 L.   
 
The priming mechanism reflects a way in which caste identity is actually made salient in 
classroom settings.  This increases the external validity of our results.  Although an individual’s 
caste is widely known in a village, publicly referring to a child’s caste is not uncommon in rural 
schools.   There is anecdotal evidence of teachers telling low-caste children to not drink from the 
tap at the school, lest it pollute the water for others.  While implementing this study, we came 
across some such instances.  Caste is commonly recorded in school enrollment books, often 
using different colors for high and low castes, to identify caste-targeted entitlements such as 
stipends and uniforms provided by state governments.  In villages, people are frequently called 
by their caste names.  Following the common usage in this area and also the way that caste is 
recorded in school enrollment books, in revealing caste identity we used the traditional name for 
each caste (Thakur, Chamar, etc.).5   
We next describe the incentive schemes.  Participants were given a packet of 15 mazes to 
solve in each of two 15-minute rounds.6  Some participants had piece rate incentives in both 
                                                          
5 In the 1998-99 Indian National Family Health Survey, households were asked to name their caste.  Most 
low-caste respondents gave their actual caste name (e.g. Chamar), but a few used the more generic and 
politically correct names, Dalit, harijan, or Scheduled Caste (Marriott 2003).   
6 The mazes are Xerox copies from http://games.yahoo.com/games/maze.html, level 3.  Gneezy, Niederle, 
and Rustichini (2003) showed that individuals do not solve mazes just for fun, they respond to incentives.   
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rounds (the “P/P treatments”); others had piece rate incentives in round 1 and tournament 
incentives in round 2 (the “P/T treatments”).  Under the piece rate scheme, a participant earned 
one rupee per maze solved.  Under the tournament scheme, he earned six rupees per maze solved 
if he solved the most mazes in his session; otherwise he earned nothing.  In case of a tie, both 
winners received the prize.  The tournament provided high-powered incentives:  a winner could 
(and some did) earn 15 x 6 rupees, equivalent to almost two days’ unskilled adult wages.  
 Figure 1 gives the organization of the experiment.  Experimental conditions were 
identical in the first round of treatments (1) and (4), (2) and (5), and (3) and (6), and so we will 
pool them when reporting first-round results.   
 
Figure 1. Experiment Design
 
Note. P/P means that the piece rate incentive applies in both rounds of maze-solving.  P/T means that the piece rate 
incentive applies in round 1 and the tournament incentive applies in round 2.  
Recruitment.  We conducted the experiment in January and March 2003 and in March 
2005.  In January 2003, on days that schools were open, we went to public schools near the site 
of the experiment and chose high- and low-caste children for each day after pooling the 
enrollment data for all nearby public schools. A letter from the District Magistrate instructed the 
teachers to cooperate with our team.  On days that schools were closed, we visited homes in 
nearby villages each evening to ask parents’ permission to pick up their children the next day to 
drive them to the junior high school that served as the site of the experiment.  In only rare 
instances did parents refuse to let their children participate.  In March 2003 and March 2005, to 
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choose the subjects, every day our team went to six randomly selected villages within a 20- 
kilometer radius of the experiment site.  From each village, we drew an equal number of high-
caste and low-caste children.  At most ten participants came from a single village, nearly always 
an equal number of H and L.  On each day, we recruited participants from a new set of villages. 
Implementation.  On arrival at the experiment site, participants waited in silence in a 
large common room while a research assistant entertained them.  When we were ready to begin 
the sessions, the participants were directed in groups of six to a new set of classrooms, where 
they remained for the rest of the experiment. They were not told anything about how or why the 
particular groups were formed.   
We next describe what took place during an experimental session, which lasted about 70 
minutes.  Under the Revealed Mixed and Revealed Segregated conditions, the experimenter 
began a session by making public the identity of the participants, as described above.  After that, 
all sessions proceeded in the same way.  The experimenter told the participants that they would 
“take part in two games of solving puzzles.”  She gave participants the show-up fee of 10 rupees 
and described how to solve a maze in this way:   
“…there is one child.  The child has to go to the ball.  The solution is a path that takes the 
child to the ball.  The black lines are walls. The child cannot cross a wall.”   
Participants were given five minutes to practice with an additional maze.  The experimenter 
explained that for each maze they solved, participants would receive an additional one rupee.  
She checked to make sure each child understood the incentive scheme.  She explained that the 
earnings of each participant would be revealed in private.  Then she told the participants that 
they would have 15 minutes to solve a packet of mazes, and the first round of maze-solving 
began.  After that round, and without giving feedback on performance, she said that there would 
be one more round of solving mazes, explained the incentive scheme (piece rate or tournament), 
and checked that each child understood it.  After the second round, participants gave information 
about their background privately in a post-play survey.  Mazes were graded blind.  Participants 
received their earnings in sealed envelopes and were taken home. 
Predictions.  Under piece rates, the output and payoff to a participant are independent of 
the output of the other participants.  Individual output thus depends only on preferences 
regarding effort provision and on ability.  In contrast, under tournament incentives, revealing the 
caste identity of the other participants might affect beliefs about the individual’s chances of 
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winning the tournament.  Since we cannot separately measure beliefs and preferences, here we 
make predictions only about performance under the piece rate scheme.  In Section 6.3, we 
discuss beliefs relevant to the tournament scheme.   
The predictions of the theories presented in Section 2 are fairly clear—see Figure 2.  Since 
preferences are fixed and always salient under the first three theories, they predict that increasing 
the salience of caste would have no effect on behavior.  In contrast, theory 4, which states that 
cues to identity have framing effects that orient action, predicts that increasing the salience of 
caste reinforces for a low-caste individual the worldview in which Dalits are accepted only so 
long as they stay in “their place,” which would reduce the utility from high achievement.  For a 
high-caste individual, the predictions under theory 4 are ambiguous.  On the one hand, the ideal 
of a high-caste person is to be superior:  making him more aware of his caste should, if anything, 
enhance his desire to conform to this ideal.  On the other hand, making caste more salient could 
activate a mental frame in which he has less need to achieve because a high-caste individual has 
an entitlement to status or because, as in the quotation from Béteille above, “a man’s social 
capacities were known from the caste or the lineage into which he was born.”  Finally, under the 
theory of "stereotype susceptibility," making caste more salient entails a negative productivity 
shock to L and, possibly, a positive productivity shock to H (Dee 2009).  
 
Figure 2.  Predicted Effects of Increasing the Salience of Caste under Piece Rate Incentives  
              Theory Predicted effect of increasing caste salience on the performance of: 
 High caste Low caste 
Effect on preferences  
     Theories 1-3 
   Individuals have well-defined preferences 
   that are always salient.   
 
 
None 
 
None 
   Theory 4  
   Increasing an individual’s awareness of an 
   aspect of his identity may cue a worldview 
   and self-concept. Individuals have multiple 
   sets of preferences, one for each worldview  
   and self-concept.  
Ambiguous— 
Cueing  an identity whose norm is 
to be superior increases the utility 
from  achievement, which 
increases effort; but evoking a 
worldview in which life chances 
depend less on effort than on caste 
decreases effort. 
Declines— 
Making a low-caste person 
more aware of his caste 
reinforces a worldview in 
which it is a norm violation for 
him to perform at a high level.  
Effect on ability: Stereotype susceptibility 
   Theory 5 
 
Ambiguous 
 
Declines 
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4.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
In this section, we describe the participants’ characteristics and broadly summarize the results.7   
Table 1 shows that parents of H have much greater education than parents of L.  For simplicity, 
the table groups together Revealed Mixed and Revealed Segregated as the “identity conditions.”  
The table shows that 45% of all H compared to 12% of all L have a mother with at least six years 
of schooling. (These are weighted averages across conditions, calculated using Figure 1.)  For 
only 5% of H, compared to 28% of L, both parents are illiterate.  Only 8% of H have fathers who 
are day laborers, compared to 18% in the case of L. These differences highlight the need to 
examine whether the correlates of caste can explain the differences between H and L in our 
results.  We can do that because the distribution of parents’ characteristics for H shares a 
common support with that for L.  For example, there are not only L who have mothers with no 
schooling; there are also H whose mothers have no schooling.  We collected data on two other 
variables in the post-play survey:  exposure to mazes, and number of participants in a session 
known that a subject knows.  
Table 1 shows that the randomization between the control and identity conditions was 
largely successful.  However, in the identity conditions, participants have parents with a 
significantly higher level of education and are significantly more likely to have had some 
exposure to mazes.  These differences should, if anything, improve performance in the identity 
conditions compared to the control.  An effect that goes the other way is that the low caste is on 
average slightly more likely to be in 6th than 7th grade in the identity conditions.8   We control for 
                                                          
7 In each time period in which we conducted the experiment (January and March 2003 and March 2005), 
we held at least six sessions under P/P incentives in the control condition.  As shown in Web Appendix 
Table A1, there were no significant differences in output by time period.  Therefore we pool the data 
across the three time periods.  We also found no experimenter effects on the number of mazes solved per 
round. 
8 Unlike for L, the randomization in terms of grade in school is perfect for H across control and identity 
treatments.  For L, the mean grade in school is 6.53 for control (Caste Not Revealed) and 6.34 for the 
identity treatments and this difference is significant, as Table 1 shows.   Further disaggregating the data by 
treatment reveals that the problem of imbalance in grade for L lies with the control versus all other treatments, and 
that this is not so in the case of H.  For H, for piece rate conditions, the means for grade in school (with standard 
deviations in parentheses) are 6.53 (0.50) for Caste Not Revealed, 6.53 (0.50) for Revealed Mixed, and 6.69 (0.47) 
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these factors in the analysis, and all results described in Section 1 are robust to these controls.  In 
particular, Results 2 and 3 that the low caste underperforms when caste is revealed is robust to 
controlling for grade in school. 
Figure 3 shows the average number of mazes solved by H.  For ease of exposition, the 
figure is divided into three blocks.  Block 1 is round 1, block 2 is round 2-piece rate, and block 3 
is round 2-tournament.  In each block, it is easy to see that H output is lowest in Revealed 
Segregated.  Under the Mann-Whitney U-test, the differences between Caste Not Revealed and 
Revealed Segregated are significant at p< .05 in all blocks.  In block 2, average output is higher 
in Revealed Mixed than in the control, but the difference is not significant.   
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
for Revealed Segregated.  For the tournament conditions, the means are 6.47 (0.50) for Caste Not Revealed, 6.44 
(0.50) for Revealed Mixed, and 6.43 (0.50) for Revealed Segregated.  On the other hand, for L, while there is little 
difference in the mean grade in school among the four identity treatments, the mean grade for Caste Not Revealed is 
higher.  For L, for piece rate conditions, the means are 6.57 (0.50) for Caste Not Revealed, 6.37 (0.48) for Revealed 
Mixed, and 6.30 (0.46) for Revealed Segregated.  For the tournament conditions, the means are 6.43 (0.50) for Caste 
Not Revealed, 6.30 (0.46) for Revealed Mixed, and 6.39 (0.49) for Revealed Segregated.    
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics for Participants 
 
High caste 
 
Low caste 
   Caste Not 
Revealed 
Identity 
conditions 
 
Caste Not 
Revealed 
Identity 
conditions 
Mother’s education     
None 32% 25% 
 
75% 68% 
Years ϵ (0,6)  26% 29% 
 
17% 17% 
At least 6 years 42% 46% 
 
8% 15% * 
Father’s education 
     None 6% 6% 
 
26% 31% 
Years ϵ (0,6)  7% 13% * 
 
22% 19% 
At least 6 years 86% 81% 
 
52% 50% 
Both parents illiterate 7% 4% 
 
26% 29% 
 
4%  7% 
 
7%  5% 
Mother works outside 
the home 
  8%  9%  16% 19% Father is a day laborer 
       Grade in school 6.51 6.51 6.53 6.34* 
Previous exposure to 
mazes  7% 15% * 
 
4% 16% * 
  
     Mean number of other 
participants known   0.55 1.14*   0.56 1.03* 
 
Notes. This table looks at the balance between treatments in which caste identity is revealed (“Identity 
conditions”) and those in which it is not.  Except for the last row, the characteristics reported in this table 
are binary.  For example, “both parents illiterate” =1 if both parents have no formal education and 
otherwise it is zero; “previous exposure to mazes before” =1 if the subject had seen mazes before and 
otherwise it is zero; and grade in school is equal to either 6th or 7th.  For binary variables, the tests of 
equality of means across conditions for the high caste are based on logit regressions, one for each 
characteristic; and similarly for the low caste.  For “mean number of other participants known,” the test of 
equality of means is based on a t-test.  * denotes rejection of the equality of means for the control and 
identity conditions at p < 0.05. 
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Figure 3. Average Output of High-Caste Participants  
 
Note.  Brackets indicate differences between treatments with 95% confidence based on the Mann-
Whitney U-test.    
 
Figure 4 superimposes on Figure 3 the average L output by condition.  All three blocks 
show that when caste is not revealed, the average output of H is almost the same as that of L.  
However, when caste is made public, the performance declines for L are generally steeper than 
those for H.   
 
  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Av
er
ag
e o
ut
pu
t 
ROUND 1  ROUND 2 
  Piece Rate    Piece Rate                               Tournament 
19 
 
Figure 4.  Average Output of High-Caste and Low-Caste Participants 
 
Note.  Black brackets indicate differences between treatments for L.  Vertical lines indicate significant 
caste gaps.  Statistical significance is based on the Mann-Whitney test with 95% confidence.    
 
Figure 5 shows how the identity conditions impair L relative to H performance at the 
very top of the ability distribution.  The figure reports, for round 2, the ratio of L participants to 
all participants with output at or above each decile.  (If H and L were equally represented 
throughout the achievement distribution and if varying caste salience had the same effect on both 
groups, all points in the figure would lie along the horizontal line at one-half; i.e. any cut of the 
distribution would have a proportion of L participants equal to about one-half.)  The figure 
shows that if the top 10 percent of participants was selected based on performance in the control 
condition, this would result in a majority L representation.  If selection was based on 
performance in Revealed Mixed, this would result in a minority L representation.  And if 
selection was based on performance in Revealed Segregated under piece rate incentives, it would 
result in an equal representation of H and L.  
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Figure 5. Proportion of the Low Caste above each Performance Decile in Round 2 
(Cumulative) 
 
 
 
Note. There is, in general, more than one subject whose performance ranks him at the border between two 
deciles. In those cases, we calculated the proportion of L among participants whose performance was 
exactly the decile performance, and allocated L in this proportion to both sides of the boundary. 
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5.  Measuring Treatment Effects 
 
5.1. Number of Mazes Solved—Full Sample   
We find patterns similar to those in Figure 4 in regressions that control for individual and family 
characteristics.  We pool all observations and allow for interactions among caste, context, and 
incentives.  Table 2, columns (1)-(4), report OLS estimates, with robust standard errors clustered 
at the individual level, for the following specification: 
 
 Mazes solved in a round  =  α + ω·(round is 2) + β·(subject is H)  +  γ·(session cues identity)                        (1) 
+ δ·(subject is H*session cues identity) + τ·(Tournament)  + λ· (Tournament*subject is H)  +  
ξ·(Tournament*session cues identity) + θ·(Tournament*subject is H * session cues identity) + μ·Ζ + error 
                 
where Z is a vector of individual and family characteristics.  α measures predicted output in the 
omitted case:  an L in Caste Not Revealed in round 1.  The next eight coefficients (from  ω to θ) 
measure round, caste, treatment effects, and the two-way and three-way interactions.9   
Two results from the table are immediate.  First, the estimated coefficients on H show 
that the caste gap is very small and always insignificant in Caste Not Revealed.  Second, the 
coefficients on tournament show that in Caste Not Revealed, tournament incentives significantly 
increase output.  The coefficients on T*H are always insignificant, which means that the 
response of H to tournament incentives is statistically indistinguishable from that of L.  
 Specification (1) uses only treatment and caste indicators.  Specification (2) adds controls 
for individual characteristics:  grade in school, previous exposure to mazes, and number of other 
participants known in a session.  Specification (3) adds controls for family characteristics.   
Between specifications (1) and (2), the only change in the set of significant treatment 
effects is that the output decline by L in Revealed Mixed under piece rates is no longer 
significant.  We report the treatment effects in Table 3, columns (1)-(2).  The top panel considers 
output under piece rates.  It shows that the treatment effects of Revealed Mixed for each caste are 
                                                          
9 For example, γ is a vector that measures the difference for L between an identity condition (Revealed Mixed or 
Revealed Segregated) and the control, under piece rate incentives.  Using a subscript s for Revealed Segregated, α  + 
ω +  γs  is the predicted output of L in round 2 of Revealed Segregated under piece rate incentives.  The predicted 
output of H in Revealed Segregated under tournament incentives is α  + ω +  β +  γs  + δs + τ + λ +  ξs + θs.  
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individually insignificant but jointly produce a significant caste gap in favor of the high caste.  
The effect of moving from Caste Not Revealed to Revealed Segregated is -0.93 mazes for H and 
L, and is significant.  Is this decline important?  One meaningful benchmark is the output effect 
of being one year younger, which is -0.43 and significant.  Thus, the treatment effect on output 
of moving from the control to Revealed Segregated is roughly double the effect on output of 
being in 6th instead of 7th grade. 
The bottom panel of Table 3 reports treatment effects of cues to caste in the tournaments.  
All four effects (that is, the two identity conditions crossed with the two caste groups) are 
negative and significant.  The declines in output are much more severe for L than for H.  For 
example, for H, Revealed Segregated decreases output by 2.25 mazes, or 34%.  The comparable 
figure for L is a decrease in output by 3.97 mazes, or 60%.   
Figure 6 graphs predicted output in round 2.  The dotted lines show that when caste is not 
revealed, output under the tournament scheme is significantly greater than under piece rates.  The 
increase is 1.3 mazes for both H and L (p-value = 0.01); in percentage terms, the boost is 25% 
for H and 28% for L. However, as shown by the solid lines, when caste is made public, there is 
no increase in output by H or L in tournaments compared to piece rates.  In fact, in Revealed 
Segregated the tournament scheme perversely reduces L output.  The decline is 1.6 mazes (p-
value < 0.01), which is equivalent to a 38% decline from the predicted level under piece rates. 
 
 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity, and observations are clustered at the level of the individual.  The omitted case is L in Caste Not 
Revealed under piece rate incentives. Column (4) excludes participants who have zero output in both rounds.  Round 2 = 1 for round 2 and zero for round 1. Grade in 
school = 1 if the participant is in grade 7, 0 if he is in grade 6.  Previous exposure to mazes = 1 if some time before the experiment, the participant had seen mazes; 0 
otherwise.  Number of other participants known is the number of others in the experimental session known to a given participant.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.10.
 
 
Table 2: OLS Estimates of the Determinants of Output per Round and Output Change between Rounds  
Dependent variable                                          Output per round   Output change between rounds 
 
Without 
individual and 
family 
characteristics 
With 
individual 
characteristics 
With 
individual 
and family 
characteristics 
 Excluding 
participants 
who solved 
zero mazes     
With individual 
characteristics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) 
High caste (H) 0.29 0.16 0.35 0.56 
 
0.25 
 
(0.35) (0.36) (0.39) (0.34) 
 
(0.42) 
Round 2 2.14*** 2.17*** 2.27*** 2.33*** 
  
 
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
  Revealed Mixed -0.70** -0.58 -0.51 -0.07 
 
-0.54 
 
(0.34) (0.37) (0.38) (0.35) 
 
(0.39) 
Revealed Segregated -0.97*** -0.93** -0.74 -0.70* 
 
-0.86** 
 
(0.37) (0.40) (0.46) (0.40) 
 
(0.43) 
Tournament (T) 1.40** 1.45** 1.44** 1.28* 
 
1.06* 
 
(0.65) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) 
 
(0.55) 
Revealed  Mixed * H 0.75 0.73 0.65 -0.12 
 
0.64 
 
(0.48) (0.50) (0.53) (0.47) 
 
(0.60) 
Revealed Segregated * H 0.02 -0.01 -0.16 -0.52 
 
-0.64 
 
(0.54) (0.58) (0.65) (0.56) 
 
(0.64) 
T*H -0.26 -0.12 -0.14 -0.04 
 
-0.44 
 
(0.89) (0.90) (0.96) (0.86) 
 
(0.77) 
Revealed  Mixed * T -1.35* -1.59** -2.02*** -1.48* 
 
-1.02 
 
(0.76) (0.78) (0.78) (0.77) 
 
(0.69) 
Revealed Segregated * T -2.77*** -3.05*** -3.02*** -2.82*** 
 
-1.38* 
 
(0.76) (0.77) (0.82) (0.77) 
 
(0.76) 
Revealed Mixed * T * H -0.07 0.02 0.67 -0.16 
 
-0.26 
 
(1.08) (1.11) (1.20) (1.08) 
 
(1.00) 
Revealed Segregated*T * H 1.73 1.73 1.91 1.92* 
 
2.56** 
 
(1.14) (1.21) (1.33) (1.16) 
 
(1.05) 
Grade in school 
 
0.43** 0.51** 0.45** 
 
0.34 
  
(0.21) (0.23) (0.21) 
 
(0.21) 
Previous exposure to mazes 
 
0.37 0.51 0.35 
 
-0.19 
  
(0.30) (0.33) (0.29) 
 
(0.36) 
Number of participants 
 
0.06 0.10 0.01 
 
0.02 
  known 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
 
(0.09) 
Mother's education Є(0,6) 
  
0.28 
   
   
(0.30) 
   Mother's education ≥ 6 
  
0.44 
   
   
(0.33) 
   Father's education Є(0,6) 
  
-0.64* 
   
   
(0.39) 
   Father's education ≥ 6 
  
-0.91*** 
   
   
(0.34) 
   Mother employed outside 
  
0.05 
     home 
  
(0.53) 
   Father not a day   
  
0.55 
     laborer 
  
(0.35) 
   Constant 3.26*** 2.97*** 2.76*** 2.98*** 
 
2.16*** 
 
(0.24) (0.28)  (0.50) (0.28) 
 
(0.32) 
R2 0.189 0.197 0.221 0.223   0.080 
N 1164 1076 928 1008   538 
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Table 3:  Treatment Effects of Making Caste Identity Public under Piece Rate and Tournament Incentives 
 
 
Output per round, full sample 
 
Output per round, excluding 
participants who solved zero mazes 
 
Output change between rounds,              
full sample 
  
H L    Caste gap significant 
 
H 
 
L     Caste gap significant 
 
H 
 
L     Caste gap significant 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
Under piece rate incentives, the effect of moving from Caste Not Revealed to: 
   Revealed Mixed 0.16 -0.58 ** 
 
-0.19 -0.07 
  
-0.22 -0.72** 
 
  
(0.36) (0.37) 
  
(0.34) (0.35) 
  
(0.38) (0.33) 
    Revealed Segregated -0.93** -0.93** 
  
-1.23*** -0.70* 
  
-1.20*** -1.22*** 
 
  
(0.42) (0.40) 
  
(0.41) (0.40) 
  
(0.41) (0.35) 
 
                            Under tournament incentives, the effect of moving from Caste Not Revealed to:      Revealed Mixed -1.42* -2.17*** 
  
-1.82** -1.54** 
  
-1.16** -1.55*** 
 
  
(0.79) (0.77) 
  
(0.75) (0.77) 
  
(0.57) (0.56) 
    Revealed Segregated -2.25** -3.97*** * 
 
-2.13** -3.52*** ** 
 
-0.42 -2.33*** *** 
  
(0.92) (0.75) 
  
(0.86) (0.75) 
  
(0.61) (0.58) 
  
Notes.  All treatment effects reported here can be derived from the regressions in Table 2:   Effects in columns (1)-(3) can be obtained from 
regression (2); those in columns (4)-(6) can be obtained from regression (4); those in columns (7)-(9) can be obtained from regression (5).   
However, it is easier to estimate these effects and obtain their standard errors by running a separate regression for each benchmark case.  For 
example, to obtain the effect on H of moving from Caste Not Revealed to Revealed Mixed under tournament incentives, a convenient benchmark 
is H, Caste Not Revealed, tournament incentives.  Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 6.  Predicted Output in Round 2:   Piece Rate and Tournament Incentives 
 
Note. Error bars are based on standard errors.  Predicted values, based on specification (2) of Table 2, control for the 
participant’s grade in school, prior exposure to mazes, and number of other participants known in the session.  See 
Supporting Figure A1 for the values. 
 
Up to now, we have discussed results controlling only for individual characteristics, 
based on specification (2) of Table 2.  We next consider the effect of controls for household 
characteristics.  This is important because it could be that the channel through which social 
identity influences behavior is class—a poor versus rich effect (Croizet and Claire 1998)—
instead of caste.  Our proxies for class are parents’ education, whether the mother is employed 
outside the home, and whether the father is employed as a day laborer.  Because stigma is 
associated with daily wage-labor, our post-play survey did not ask the participants, “Is your 
father a day laborer?”  Instead the survey asked about the father’s occupation.  We formed a 
binary variable for daily wage labor based on the response.   
Specification (3) of Table 2 reports the regression results controlling for our proxies 
for class.  The main change in the results when we add controls for class is that the decline in 
performance in Revealed Segregated is reduced, and it is significant at p < 0.10 only for H, 
not for L (for whom the decline is only -0.74 mazes, p-value = 0.11),   
Our other qualitative results are little changed by adding the controls for parental 
characteristics.  Three points, which hold for specifications (1) and (2), remain clear as well 
for specification (3):   
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(1)  For H, it is segregation rather than merely making caste public that impairs 
performance.  Compared to the condition in which caste is not revealed, Revealed Mixed 
slightly and insignificantly increases H output, whereas Revealed Segregated strongly reduces 
it (the effect is -1.03;  p-value =0.03).   
(2)  H and L are equally good at solving mazes when caste is not revealed.  In contrast, 
in Revealed Mixed a caste gap in favor of H emerges (= 0.35 + 0.65=1.0; p-value = 0.01).   
(3) Making caste public eliminates the positive response to tournament incentives for 
both groups. In Revealed Segregated, L’s response is strongly negative (= -1.58 mazes, p-
value = 0.004).  
We have emphasized specification (2) in Table 2 more than specification (3) because 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that parental variables have no effect on performance: 
F(6,486) = 1.58, p = 0.11.  The only proxy for class that is individually significant is father’s 
education, and the result was in the opposite direction from what is required to explain the 
superior performance of H as an effect of class.  Boys with educated fathers actually solve 
fewer mazes than their counterparts.   
It might be, however, that parental variables matter for L, but not H, because having 
educated parents alleviates low-caste stigma.  Therefore in unreported regressions, we rerun 
specification (3) separately for H and L participants.  We still find that parental variables have 
little explanatory power and are insignificant by an F-test.  We also checked for the effect of 
having both parents illiterate.  We find that this is not significant (result not shown).  In these 
and all other regressions that we have run, we find no evidence that class is the channel 
through which caste influences behavior.  However, since we do not have measures of income 
and wealth, the concern that unobserved class variables may matter, remains.   
 
5.2   Between-Round Change in the Number of Mazes Solved 
 
As an additional check on our results, we consider the treatment effects on the change in output 
between rounds:  see Table 3, the last three columns.  We find that for both H and L, the 
impairment of performance in Revealed Segregated compared to the control remains significant 
under the piece rate scheme (p-value < 0.01).  Thus, whether our dependent variable is the output 
level or the between-round change in output, we obtain a counter-stereotype susceptibility result 
for H and a pro-stereotype susceptibility result for L.  
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To investigate whether the counter-stereotype susceptibility result for H comes from a 
shift in preferences that lead to reduced effort or, alternatively,  a decline in the ability to perform 
when identity is blatantly primed (as in Shih et al. 2002, discussed in Section 2), in the remainder 
of this section we decompose performance into two stages:   
Stage 1. The participant learns what it means to solve a maze.  The outcome is binary—
success or failure.  We measure failure by zero output by a participant during the 30 
minutes of maze-solving. 
 
Stage 2. The participant applies and improves his skills.  The outcome is the number of 
mazes solved conditional on success in learning how to solve a maze. 
 
5.3   Failure to Learn How to Solve a Maze 
 
Here we consider stage 1. Table 4 shows that failure for H occurs more often in the control than 
in the identity conditions, whereas the reverse is true for L.  To fit a logit model, it is necessary 
to collapse the two identity conditions and also the two incentive conditions.10   We estimate  
 
  Failure  =  α + β·(subject is H)  +  γ·(session cues identity)                   (2) 
 + δ·(subject is H * session cues identity)  +   μ·Ζ   +   error, 
 
where the benchmark case is L in Caste Not Revealed.   We use the logit results, reported in 
Supporting Table A2, to predict the probability of failure.  Figure 7 reports the results, 
controlling for individual characteristics.  The figure shows that revealing caste reduces failure 
among H from 8% to 2%, and increases failure among L from 1% to 11%.  These changes are 
statistically significant and robust to the addition of controls for household characteristics.  These 
changes are also consistent with the predictions of stereotype susceptibility:  when the 
participants are made more aware of caste, H are less likely, and L are more likely, to completely 
fail to learn how to solve a maze.  These results suggest that the identity conditions do not 
depress the ability of H to perform a cognitive task.  They suggest instead that the decline we 
find in H output in Revealed Segregated reflects a change in preferences regarding the provision 
of effort.  
 
                                                          
10 Otherwise the estimates are unbounded, since some cells in Table 4 are empty.     
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Table 4.  Proportion of Participants with Zero Output 
Treatment 
Number of participants with zero 
output /Total number of 
participants of the respective 
caste in the treatment 
  Proportion 
  High caste Low caste  High caste Low caste 
P/P- Caste Not Revealed 7/78 2/78   0.09 0.03 
P/P-Revealed Mixed 1/60 9/60   0.02 0.15 
P/P- Revealed Segregated 1/30 2/30   0.03 0.07 
  
  
  
  P/T -Caste Not Revealed 2/30 0/30   0.07 0 
P/T- Revealed Mixed 0/60 6/60   0 0.10 
P/T -Revealed Segregated 3/30 4/36   0.10 0.11 
 
 
 
 Figure 7.  Predicted Probability of Failure  
 
Note. Based on the logit regression in Supporting Table A2, column (1).  The control variables are grade in school, 
prevision exposure to mazes, and number of other participants in the session known.  The predicted probabilities are 
estimated at the means of the control variables.     
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5.4   Number of Mazes Solved by the Subsample Excluding Non-Learners   
An advantage of decomposing performance into stages is that we can consider treatment effects 
on performance conditional on knowing how to solve a maze (i.e. on “stage 2”).  We report these 
effects in Table 3, columns (4)-(5).  Are the qualitative results for the full sample robust in the 
subsample?   
The high caste.  Consider H first.  For H, we find that the treatment effects are stronger 
in the subsample than in the full sample.  The reason is that in the subsample, we are not 
capturing the “stage 1” effect, in which making caste public increases the probability that H will 
learn to solve a maze.  Under piece rate incentives, in the full sample the treatment effect of 
Revealed Segregated is -0.93 (p < 0.05), compared to -1.23 (p < 0.01) in the subsample.  We 
view this latter figure (-1.23) as our best estimate of the “entitlement effect.”  This is the effect 
on a high-caste boy’s output, conditional on his knowing how to solve a maze, of moving from 
the control condition (where the authority figure is silent about caste) to Revealed Segregated 
(where segregation cues high-caste boys’ place in the social order).  We call it the entitlement 
effect because we conjecture that it captures the reduced felt need to work hard to achieve 
individual success in a situation that cues one’s place in the traditional, ascriptive social order.  
The decline of 1.23 mazes per round represents a 26% decrease in output relative to average 
output for H over the two rounds in the piece rate-control condition (calculated from Table 2, 
column (4)).  The entitlement effect on H is thus about the same size as the effect of stereotype 
threat on L     (= -23%).  This treatment effect size is large.  For example, it is the same order of 
magnitude –but of opposite sign—as the effect of switching from piece rates to tournaments in 
the control condition (25% for H and 28% for L).  
There may be an alternative interpretation of the decline in H output in Revealed 
Segregated.  Since the caste order is always contested, it could be that only in Revealed 
Segregated do H feel the absence of a need to affirm and demonstrate their superiority, even if 
only to themselves.  That is possible.  Ultimately, this interpretation comes down to largely the 
same thing as our preferred one, namely, that contexts that reinforce the complacency of the high 
caste in their superior status induce them to value less the rewards from individual achievement.   
The low caste.  Next consider the treatment effects for L in the subsample compared to 
the full sample (Table 3, columns (2) and (5)).  We find that making caste public reduces output 
less in the subsample because in the subsample, we are not capturing the stage 1 effect, in which 
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making caste identity public reduces the probability that L will learn how to solve a maze.  In the 
subsample, the treatment effect of Revealed Segregated is no longer significant under piece rates.  
This suggests that under piece rate incentives, the identity conditions hurt L primarily by hurting 
their ability to learn a new task (maze-solving).  In contrast, under tournament incentives, the 
treatment effects of the identity conditions that we found in the full sample remain large and 
significant in the subsample.  This means that for L, the identity conditions impair both the 
ability to learn and, conditional on knowing how to solve a maze, the response to tournament 
incentives.  
6.  Further Evidence  
 
In this section, we discuss evidence that bears on the mental frames that Revealed Segregated 
evokes in high-caste and low-caste boys.   
Revealed Segregated reduces the self-confidence of the low-caste boys.  In an earlier 
experiment (Hoff and Pandey 2005), we used random assignment of participants to the three 
conditions of caste salience (Caste Not Revealed, Revealed Mixed, and Revealed Segregated) in 
order to assess the relationship between caste salience and self-confidence.  In a six-person 
session, H and L were taught how to solve a wooden puzzle that we had constructed along the 
lines of the game Rush-Hour Traffic Jam.  At the end of the session, participants had to make a 
choice between a sure payoff and a lottery with a high payoff if the individual solved a new 
puzzle successfully and zero otherwise.  In choosing the lottery, a participant was betting on his 
own success.  The outcome is thus a test of self-confidence.  The results showed no caste gap in 
the acceptance rate of the lottery in the Caste Not Revealed and Revealed Mixed conditions.  In 
contrast, in Revealed Segregated, there was a large and significant caste gap in the proportion 
that accepted the lottery when the puzzle was difficult and the judge had some discretion in 
evaluating a player’s success.  The caste gap occurred because of a large and significant decline 
in the acceptance rate by L, and a small increase in the acceptance rate by H, compared to Caste 
Not Revealed.  These results are support the hypothesis that Revealed Segregated evokes a 
mental frame in which a low-caste boy feels that “I can’t (or don’t dare to) excel” and a high-
caste boy suffers no loss in self-confidence. 
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In the tournaments, we cannot disentangle framing effects from strategic responses to 
equilibrium play.  Recall that making caste public eliminated the positive response to 
tournament incentives compared to piece rates.  This finding is consistent with an interpretation 
based on framing effects:   when caste is salient, H may feel less need to excel whereas L feel 
they can’t or don’t dare to excel.  The potential prize for winning a lottery is high in absolute 
terms:  90 rupees, equivalent to almost two days’ adult wages.  As noted above, in the traditional 
caste order, attempts by an individual low-caste person to better himself trigger punishment.  
However, strategic responses to equilibrium play can also explain the non-response of H 
to tournament incentives in Revealed Segregated.  If we make the plausible assumption that H 
believe that low-caste boys will choose not to compete because for an L to win against an H 
would violate the traditional caste order (or that L cannot compete effectively since they are less 
able than high-caste boys), then compared to the mixed tournaments, the high-caste-segregated 
tournaments would have low expected returns to effort because the participants know they are 
competing against five H boys.  
Another seemingly plausible explanation of the underperformance of H in Revealed 
Segregated tournaments —which we can rule out—is that H do not wish to differentiate 
themselves from others in their community.  This explanation is not germane because an 
individual’s community is his specific endogamous caste, whereas the sessions were composed 
of individuals from many specific castes at the high end of the caste hierarchy—Thakur (36%), 
Brahmin (32%) Kshatriya 29%, and others (less than 1%).  Thus, a high-caste boy in Revealed 
Segregated would not find himself among boys of only his own specific caste.  Earlier 
experiments in the state of Uttar Pradesh reveal solidarity among men of the same specific high-
status castes (Hoff, Kshetremade, and Fehr, 2011) and spite between men of different specific 
castes (Fehr, Hoff, and Kshetremade 2008).  
Observational studies of school enrollment point to a causal effect of high salience of 
the caste order on low school enrollment by both high- and low-caste students.   Consider 
again our conjecture that when the social division between high and low castes is salient, a high-
caste boy may think, “I don’t need to excel.”  If this is correct, it would predict that when caste 
boundaries are eroded, a high-caste boy (or his family on his behalf) may think, “I need to work 
harder to better myself.”  This prediction is consistent with the findings in Kochar (2004).  She 
analyzes an Indian government policy to construct schools in low-caste hamlets.  The policy led 
to an increase in low-caste enrollment.  The increased school enrollment of low-caste children 
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had, however, an unintended effect:  it increased the enrollment rate of the upper castes!  Thus, 
aid targeted to Dalits did not, as policy-makers had expected, narrow the schooling gap between 
the Dalits and the rest of society.  The increase in high-caste enrollment maintained the relative 
superiority of the high caste in years of education.11 
Finally, an observational study in Pakistan identifies a causal impact of high-caste 
dominance and low enrollment of low-caste children in school.  This finding is consistent with 
our conjecture that cues to the caste order evoke a mental frame that impairs low-caste 
individuals’ ability or desire (or both) to achieve in the classroom.  Jacoby and Mansuri (2011) 
analyze data from a survey of over 3000 households and 1000 elementary schools in rural 
Pakistan.  They define a settlement as high-caste-dominant if a high caste owns the majority of 
land in the settlement, giving them the power to enforce the traditional caste order.  They show 
that low-caste children are deterred from enrolling in schools in high-caste dominant settlements.  
In fact, the very low enrollment of low-caste children12 for whom the closest available school is 
in a high-caste-dominant hamlet can account for the entire enrollment gap favoring high-caste 
over low-caste children  The following responses from low-caste women to the question, “Do 
children receive the same treatment from teachers,” illustrate the kinds of exclusionary norms 
imposed on low-caste individuals:    
“They let the daughters of [high castes] use the latrines, but tell our daughters to use the 
fields because you stink.” “The teachers make the daughters of Zamindar Zaats [high 
castes] sit inside the rooms, under the fans.  Our poor children are outside, under the sun 
and dust” (Jacoby and Mansuri, p. 7).  
 
In sum, these two observational studies —the only studies of which we are aware that 
examine the effect on achievement of increasing or decreasing the salience of the caste order—
indicate that when one’s traditional status in the social order seems more fixed, both high- and 
low-caste individuals are less likely to enroll in school.   
 
7.   Conclusion 
 
The experimental data show that being hard-working or clever is not a trait of the person, in the 
sense that it is always there, in a fixed manner.  Instead, situational cues to one’s place in the 
                                                          
11 We thank Anjini Kochar for bringing her work to our attention. 
12Especially girls, for whom honor considerations restrict the freedom to travel outside their own hamlet. 
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social order influence the expression of these traits.  Segregation by caste status sharply reduced 
the performance of high-caste boys under piece rate incentives, and this effect could be 
explained only by a change in their preferences regarding the provision of effort.  Cues to caste 
identity under piece rate incentives also produced a caste gap in performance in favor of the high 
caste by depressing the ability of the low-caste to learn a new skill.  The influence of identity 
was determined not by a fixed set of values, but instead by background settings that evoked a 
particular aspect of the self or worldview.   
Borrowing from the title of a recent book, Framed by Gender (Ridgeway 2011), one 
might say that our subjects were framed by caste.  Our results for the high caste extend the 
literature in economics on framing effects to preferences regarding the provision of effort, and 
show that the effect can be first-order, equivalent in our study to twice the effect on output of 
being one year younger.    
Our findings contribute to a richer view of institutional change.  Institutions entail rules 
and social identities.  For example, when towns emerged in medieval Europe,“[i]t was not only 
that the serf, having escaped from the countryside, found legal freedom in the town, but that the 
while social atmosphere there was open to ambition and talent” (Cipolla 1994, p. 119).  After an 
institution is formally abolished, the identities founded on the superseded rules will continue to 
affect chronic ways that people think about themselves and interpret the world if prevailing 
situations make those identities salient.  No one would argue with this (although these ideas 
rarely enter into economic models).  Our findings suggest that boys in India hold, in uneasy 
tension, the caste-based view of their social world and the individualistic view that each person 
shapes his own destiny.  Both views influence their preferences and behavior.  The context 
determines which view is uppermost.  We measured the effects on output and learning of 
manipulating the salience of the traditional identities. 
We argued that it is a useful construct to posit that individuals have multiple preferences, 
one for each self-concept or worldview.  Useful for what?  Useful for understanding long-run 
social change, which entails changes in the salience of particular identities, the set of possible 
identities, and the possible ways of understanding a situation.  This perspective opens up a new 
set of policy options for enhancing human capital formation and development.  This perspective 
highlights the relevance to economics of understanding how the set of possible identities evolves 
in a society.  Recent work in economics takes up this exciting question (e.g. Hoff and Sen 2006, 
Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006, Hoff and Stiglitz 2010, and Greif and Tabellini 2012).   
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